House of Lords - European Union

Select Committee on European Union Fourteenth Report

CHAPTER 2: The wider context

7. Research on the fiscal effects of migration is limited. In 2002 the Home Office published a report entitled The Migrant Population in the UK: Fiscal Effects.[3] It estimated that in 1999/2000 immigrants to the United Kingdom contributed £31.2 billion in taxes and consumed £28.8 billion in benefits and state services, a net contribution of £2.5 billion. The study attracted some criticism for its methodology and also on the ground that it had failed to apportion the whole cost of the immigration system to migrants.[4] (The latter criticism seems misconceived: the costs of controlling immigration should not fall wholly on the immigrants.) More recently, the Institute for Public Policy Research published a paper entitled Paying their way: the fiscal contribution of immigrants in the UK,[5] which reviewed the evidence, taking into account the methodological criticisms of the previous report. The findings of the IPPR study confirmed those of the Home Office study, and indeed concluded that the relative net contribution of immigrants to public finances increased between 1999 and 2004. It estimated that total revenue from immigrants grew in real terms from £33.8 billion in 1999-2000 to £41.2 billion in 2003-2004, a 22 per cent increase (compared with a six per cent increase from people born in the United Kingdom). The study also found that immigrants make a relatively greater net fiscal contribution than people born in the United Kingdom and have become proportionately greater net contributors to the public finances than non-immigrants.

8. The economic consequences of migration, however, go beyond the fiscal effects. The debate here consists of four main elements:

the effect of migration on innovation and growth;
its effect on employment and welfare;
its implications in respect of the changing demographics of Europe; and
its consequences for countries of origin.

In all these areas there was a strong measure of agreement among most of the witnesses, perhaps surprisingly given the controversial nature of the subject. We discuss the first three of these issues below, and the consequences for countries of origin in paragraphs 33-37.

INNOVATION AND GROWTH

9. According to the Government's evidence, Treasury estimates suggest that migration accounts for ten per cent of trend growth forecasts.[6] This positive assessment of the effect of immigration on growth and innovation was strongly supported by the witnesses we heard in Brussels. The EU's Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2000 to improve the competitiveness of the EU economy, including through research and innovation, recognises the importance of immigration to the achievement of these objectives. Even MigrationWatch, an organisation that lobbies for a reduction in immigration to the United Kingdom, acknowledged the positive economic effect of immigration (while maintaining that it did not outweigh the arguments for greater restrictions on immigration).[7] Ministers told us that they regarded the United Kingdom's decision to permit (subject to a registration requirement) free movement of workers from all the 2004 Accession States as evidence of a successful policy.[8] We discuss the effects of enlargement and its implications in paragraphs 13-21.

EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

10. As for the effects of migration on employment, the Government were firmly of the view that, rather than competing with the resident population for jobs, migrants expand sectors and create opportunities. Margaret Hodge MP, the Minister of State for Employment and Welfare Reform, told us that "migration has supported prosperity and growth and added value to the UK domestic product and to jobs".[9]

11. It is commonly asserted that immigrants are a drain on the benefit system. On the contrary, the studies referred to in paragraph 7 above show that overall immigrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in benefits. Moreover, the assertion about benefits is even less justified in the case of economic migrants than of immigrants generally since they are by definition admitted for employment or self-employment; and in the United Kingdom economic migrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) have no entitlement to welfare benefits. Under section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, a person subject to immigration control is precluded from claiming non-contributory benefits.[10] Those admitted for employment or self-employment become eligible for contributory benefits only when they have the necessary national insurance contribution record.

THE "DEMOGRAPHIC DEFICIT"

12. The demographic challenges facing the EU are also often referred to in the debate on economic migration. Labour migrants tend to have younger age profiles than the average population. According to Eurostat, the Commission's statistical office, by 2010 deaths in the EU 25 will outnumber births. For a time immigration will compensate for this "demographic deficit", but by 2025 the beneficial demographic effects of inward migration (calculated on current rates) will no longer outweigh the natural decrease, and the total population of the EU—albeit with wide variations between Member States—will start to decline gradually.[11] A table showing the current population of each of the Member States and projections for 2025 and 2050 is at Appendix 4. It is estimated that, on current trends, by 2025 there will be a 20 million shortfall of workers across the EU. One of the challenges facing EU Member States is determining how to satisfy pension requirements among populations with increasing numbers of retired people and decreasing numbers of participants in the labour force as a result of these demographic changes.

Free movement of persons within the EU

13. Free movement of persons for economic purposes is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU, along with free movement of goods, services and capital. The EU has strongly embraced the principle that the movement of persons for economic purposes is a central part of the internal market. This position, first adopted in the Treaty of Rome, has been consistently strengthened with each revision of the treaties. Nor has this been exclusively limited to EC nationals (later EU citizens). Even in its original form the Treaty provided for the adoption of secondary legislation to bring third country national service providers based within the Community within the scope of this free movement right.[12] Encouraging free movement of persons has been and continues to be a high priority of the EU institutions, as Madame Quintin, the Director-General for Employment, confirmed to us in emphasising that the Commission's approach up to now had been primarily one of removing obstacles to mobility.[13]

14. The underlying premise is that movement of persons for economic activity is not only necessary in the interests of EU market integration but positively beneficial to growth and innovation in the EU. It is also considered an important contributor to achieving higher levels of labour market participation. However, as currently constructed, the right of free movement of persons has two important limitations: first, it is territorially limited to the Member States of the EU (though subject to continuing expansion as a result of successive enlargements); and secondly, it is subject to a limitation on the basis of nationality—only nationals of the Member States and their family members (of any nationality) are entitled to exercise these rights in their personal capacity (this class also increasing with each enlargement).

15. The EU's general approach to immigration policy is underpinned by a belief that globalisation in the sense of cross border movement of economic activities—goods, persons, services and capital—is prima facie economically beneficial. Consistently with this position the EU has taken a similar approach in international trade fora, notably the World Trade Organization (WTO). A notable example of this is the EU position in the Doha round of the re-negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is intended to promote market liberalisation in the provision of services. In June 2005 the EU made a revised offer which, among other things, would enable services companies in 21 sectors to transfer skilled employees to the EU, including the new Member States, for six months at a time (and management trainees for 12 months).

16. Within the EU's internal market, competition among the Member States for qualified workers and innovators depends on employers attracting the right staff to their enterprises; for workers and innovators from outside the EU the situation is different. Here national immigration policies are an important factor in facilitating or hindering the access of individuals to the territory and labour market. Some Member States are seen as competing with others for certain classes of workers from outside the EU by means of their immigration regulations.

Variations between Member States

17. Among the factors to be taken into account in this regard are the differences in the economies of the Member States and in their labour needs. While the EU's internal market is, in law, a single market, this does not prevent substantial variations in economic performance between the Member States. For instance, in March 2005 the unemployment rate in the "old" Member States ranged from 10.0 per cent in Spain, 9.9 per cent in Greece, and 9.8 per cent in France and Germany to 5.0 per cent in Austria, 4.8 per cent in the Netherlands, 4.6 per cent in the United Kingdom and 4.3 per cent in Ireland. The table at Appendix 4 shows the unemployment rates and the GDP growth rates for all 25 Member States.

18. Further, as Mr Marco Formisano of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) pointed out, there is very substantial variation in the type of economic migration which EU Member States consider that they need, ranging from highly skilled to unskilled workers.[14] Most Member States appear to have schemes which are designed for different skill levels though greater emphasis appears to be placed on some categories than others. For example, in the United Kingdom the Government's five year strategy for immigration and asylum indicates a substantial preference for highly skilled migrants.[15] The needs of other Member States, such as Spain, which have large agricultural sectors, include substantial numbers of unskilled workers, though southern Europe is also subject to exceptional migration pressures from North Africa and elsewhere.

19. Among the biggest challenges to a common policy on EU economic migration are the large differences in growth and employment rates between Member States, and in the labour shortages or gaps at the national level. It is clear that any common EU policy on economic migration would have to build into its basic design sufficient flexibility to accommodate national and indeed regional variations. The ability of the EU to achieve a common position in the field of services suggests that a similar consensus on broad guidelines for economic migration might be attainable, but it is unlikely that the Member States would accept it.

Enlargement

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

20. On 1 May 2004 ten new Member States joined the European Union. The nationals of two of them, Cyprus and Malta, had full free movement rights throughout the EU from the date of accession. But it was open to each of the existing Member States to decide, in relation to nationals of the other eight new Member States (often referred to as the "A8" (accession eight)), whether to accord them full free movement rights from the outset or withhold them for a series of transitional periods totalling seven years.[16] In the event all the "old" Member States, except for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, decided not to give nationals of the A8 countries the right to work immediately, in order to protect their domestic labour markets. The United Kingdom gave them the right to work from the outset, but in the face of public concern about the effects of doing so, instituted shortly before 1 May measures requiring them to register under the Worker Registration Scheme and restricting access to benefits.

21. The new Member States themselves naturally pressed for their nationals to have the full benefits of EU membership from the outset and have continued to urge that the transitional periods be kept as short as possible. They understandably resent discussion of freer entry for third country nationals when their own nationals are still subject to restrictions. As Professor Groenendijk[17] put it, "the eight new Member States will not agree to any rules on the admission of third country nationals so long as their own nationals are still experiencing all kinds of barriers in most of the old Member States".[18]

UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE

22. The Worker Registration Scheme has provided detailed information about the effects of enlargement on economic migration from the A8 countries to the United Kingdom, and the Government have issued regular accession monitoring reports based on it. The most recent report records that in the 14 months from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005 there were 232,000 applicants to the scheme, many of whom—up to 30 per cent—were already in the United Kingdom before 1 May 2004.[19] Ninety-seven per cent of workers were working full time, the great majority of them young and single. Eighty-two per cent were aged between 18 and 34 and only two per cent had dependants under the age of 17 with them. The majority of workers were in unskilled occupations, but there were also significant numbers in professional occupations and in public services, notably as care workers (5,500). More than half of the applicants were Polish, with Lithuanians the second largest national group (15 per cent). The applicants were spread throughout the country with the largest number (19 per cent) in London, but the proportion applying to London fell from 26 per cent in the second quarter of 2004 to 13 per cent in the second quarter of 2005. There were very few applications for benefits: of 1700 applications for income support and job seeker's allowance only 50 were allowed to proceed to further consideration.

23. The number of A8 nationals seeking employment in the United Kingdom following accession has greatly exceeded official estimates made beforehand.[20] This may have been due partly to the fact that, apart from Ireland and Sweden, other existing Member States have not yet opened their doors to nationals of the A8 countries. Nevertheless the evidence from the accession monitoring reports is that these workers have filled vacancies, without any significant effect on wage levels or the overall unemployment rate. According to Mrs Hodge, accession of the A8 countries and their nationals' free access to the United Kingdom labour market "has been of benefit to the British economy in terms of our competitiveness, productivity and growth, with no impact, as far as we can tell so far, on either wage rates or employment rates".[21] To that extent the United Kingdom has benefited economically from the fact that these workers were unable to secure employment so readily in other Member States. Nor has the influx of mainly young, single Eastern European workers had any significant disadvantages that were brought to our attention.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU

24. As explained above, the numbers of A8 workers coming to the United Kingdom following accession are likely to have been inflated by the fact that only three of the "old" Member States accorded them free movement rights from the date of their accession. They would no doubt have sought employment opportunities more evenly across the EU if they had had equal access across all the Member States. Nevertheless the lesson for the EU as a whole seems clear. There is little to fearand much to gainfrom the extension of freedom of movement rights to the new Member States. Movement within the EU is driven primarily by economic considerations: it is no coincidence that the A8 countries from which most workers have come to the United Kingdom are those with two of the highest unemployment ratesPoland and Lithuania.

25. All those we spoke to in Brussels on the subject were strongly of the opinion that the transitional restrictions on the A8 Members States should be lifted as soon as possible. Dr Apap, an adviser to the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (the LIBE Committee) told us that that was the view of the European Parliament;[22] the European Trades Union Confederation (ETUC) agreed.[23] Mr Formisano of CEPS described the transitional measures as "useless"[24], as in his view they had been in the previous enlargement of Spain and Portugal: most Member States had applied transitional measures to the A8 countries despite studies by the Commission showing that they were unnecessary. Commissioner Špidla, the Employment Commissioner, told us that he was convinced that it would be in line with the Lisbon Strategy to waive the remaining transitional periods.[25] He explained that there would be an initial evaluation of them by the Commission in 2006.[26] In the light of that evaluation the Member States will decide whether to lift the restrictions or retain them for a further three years. At the end of that period a Member State still applying restrictions may ask the Commission to extend them for a further two years if it can show serious disturbances in its labour market or the threat of them. The transitional measures could therefore last for a total of seven years.

26. We believe that it would be in the EU's interest to extend full free movement rights to the A8 countries as soon as possible. Until that happens, it would be inappropriate—and inconsistent with the need for solidarity with the new Member States—to relax controls on the admission of third country national workers. The new Member States themselves would, reasonably enough, be likely to be reluctant to consider such relaxation.

FUTURE ACCESSION

28. The opening of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey has recently been approved. The application of free movement rights to the citizens of those countries will be an important and sensitive issue in the negotiations with them, particularly with Turkey given the size of its population. Negotiations with Croatia are likely to be shorter, perhaps in the region of four years. However, the EEC Turkey Association Agreement[27] already provides, through its subsidiary legislation, rights of continued residence and employment for Turkish workers lawfully within the EU. The gradual extension of these provisions to encompass more extensive free movement rights over what is likely to be a lengthy period of negotiations and transition will need careful handling. Managing the migration aspirations of nationals of candidate countries, coupled with investment in infrastructure and jobs in the candidate country, is the best way to avoid fears of disruption to the labour market in the period following accession.

IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION FROM OUTSIDE THE EU

29. It is sometimes assumed that enlargement, creating an economic area with a total population of some 460 million, reduces—or even removes—the need for immigration from outside the EU, apart from those with certain specialised skills. Sir Andrew Green, the Chairman of MigrationWatch, argued that enlargement was a good reason for reducing the inflow of migrants from the rest of the world.[28] At first sight the movement of A8 workers to the United Kingdom following enlargement may appear to support that view. But that is unlikely to be the case. That movement seems to have been stimulated largely by high rates of unemployment and lower levels of economic opportunity in the sending countries, which may not continue as membership of the EU brings a greater measure of economic convergence. Moreover, the populations of the new Member States are ageing as quickly as the pre-accession 15, more so in some cases. So there is unlikely to be a continuing pool of young workers from the new Member States to fill vacancies in the EU as a whole. The accession of Turkey may change the situation, but in the meantime economic migration from outside the present EU will in our view continue to be needed.

The international dimension

GLOBALISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES

30. As we have already noted, the effects of globalisation on EU economies is not uniform. As Appendix 4 shows, growth and unemployment rates vary substantially across the Member States. The increasing importance of services as a major contributor to GDP, however, holds true across the EU. Studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show that most of the variation in employment rates across OECD countries is accounted for by the services sector. The OECD considers that services, which account for an even higher share of employment in the United Kingdom than in the Eurozone, offer considerable job creation potential.[29] It has also pointed out that by and large services markets have remained segmented: the integration of services markets lags far behind that of goods.

31. Moves to liberalise controls on service providers (i.e. companies providing services) place some constraints on Member States' freedom to regulate admission for employment. The broad aim of these initiatives is to create a level playing field for service providers—in terms of their ability to transfer employees freely from undertakings in one country to another. These moves derive from two separate sources: the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), to which we have already referred,[30] which applies worldwide; and the draft Services Directive currently under discussion within the EU, which is intended to ensure equal treatment for service providers across the EU. We published a report on the draft Directive in July 2005.[31]

32. The GATS, currently under renegotiation in the Doha Round with a view to further liberalisation of the services market internationally, indicates a widely held view that services are a priority sector. Some see the movement of service providers and their personnel to carry out economic activities across borders not only as an opportunity for job creation but also as a risk to national labour markets. Ms Catelene Passchier of the ETUC referred to increasing concern in some countries about cross-border movement.[32] However, the more prevalent view of our government and Commission witnesses, also shared by UNICE,[33] was that liberalisation in this area would not undermine Member States' policies. Tony McNulty, the Immigration Minister, said that GATS was essentially a trade agreement, which "does not override our ability to control things within the context of the national immigration rules".[34] The Commission's Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security thought that GATS would not affect policies on economic migration for the rather different reason that service providers and their personnel do not enter the labour market of the host Member State.[35] Madame Quintin, the Employment Director-General, also took the view that GATS had nothing to do with immigration or access to the employment market because it was concerned only with the temporary provision of services by workers who were returning to their country of origin.[36] It seems likely that over time the movement of workers resulting from the liberalisation of services will become a more significant element of transnational migration. But the broad consensus of our witnesses was that it was unlikely in the foreseeable future to impinge very directly on Member States' economic migration policies or to affect the arguments for and against the case for an EU policy in this area.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

33. Discussion of economic migration tends to focus on the benefits and costs to the receiving countries. There is, however, an alternative perspective on the movement of persons for economic activity, and this is the consequence for countries of origin, particularly those in the developing world, of the emigration of their people. The export of surplus unskilled or low skilled labour is likely to be in the interests of the sending country as well as the receiving country, but the developed world is equally if not more interested in recruiting skilled workers, who may also be in short supply in the sending country, which will not recoup the training costs involved. This problem is particularly acute in the health sector. A particularly striking example was given to us by Patrick Taran of the International Labour Organization (ILO), who had been told when in southern Africa recently that half the wards in the national public health hospital in the capital of Botswana had been closed down because of shortages of nursing staff, who had been recruited to work in the United Kingdom and other western countries.[37] A similar situation can arise in Europe. Madame Quintin noted that Romania was losing many doctors, who were well trained but badly paid, to the old Member States.[38]

34. While there was substantial concern among our witnesses about the effects of highly skilled workers leaving developing countries, there was no unanimity on what should be done. The phenomenon of "brain drain" was invoked mainly as an argument for inhibiting economic migration from the developing world. In no case was it presented as a reason for preventing emigration from the developed world. A recent report by the World Bank estimated that nearly one sixth of working age, British born graduates (1.44 million) live and work overseas, proportionately more than any other country.[39] It was also interesting to note that those who expressed concern about brain drain vis à vis developing countries were reticent as regards economic migration from those same countries but limited to the unskilled. It was argued that economic migration from the developing world, whether skilled or unskilled, had a number of virtuous consequences, not least the opportunity of gainful employment for the unemployed, utilisation of expensively acquired but underutilised skills for the underemployed, and the development of new skills for all economic migrants.

35. Of particular importance are the sums remitted to migrants' home countries, which Don Flynn of JCWI saw as a key way to permit economic migrants to make choices about how to invest in their countries of origin. The World Bank estimated that in 2004 $120 billion—a sum far exceeding levels of development aid—was sent home by migrant workers to their families in developing countries.[40] The level of outward remittances from the United Kingdom is estimated as between three and four billion pounds a year.[41] As Sir Andrew Green of MigrationWatch pointed out, this amounts to some £10 million pounds a day but does not compensate developing countries for the loss of key people.[42]

36. Both Mr Flynn and Sir Andrew Green suggested that there might be scope for some form of compensation for countries losing expensively trained workers in, for example the health sector. Mr Flynn referred to a scheme operated by the Department for International Development, which assists Malawi directly to keep nurses working there. In general, however, few of our witnesses favoured the option of tying economic migration to aid as a way of compensating the loss of skilled workers in developing countries. Commissioner Špidla said that he could not "conceive" of compensation for third countries. The Commission has recently published a communication on migration and development, which identifies a number of practical ways of improving the impact of migration on development.[43] These include facilitating the transmission of remittances, encouraging "circular migration", and mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain.

37. This is a large and complex issue to which there are no easy solutions. A combination of approaches is required. First, given the importance of remittances, it is crucial that ways of facilitating their transmission are developed, as the Green Paper proposes; and we welcome the proposals on this in the Commission's recent Communication. Secondly, as the Sussex Centre for Migration Research proposed, there is a need to make international codes of conduct in international recruitment more effective.[44] Thirdly, we would not rule out as readily as Commissioner Špidla did the idea of some form of compensation in strictly defined circumstances, such as apply in the Malawian example. But the main instrument to assist developing countries is in the context of negotiating association and co-operation agreements where, as Mr Flynn of JCWI argued, the migration dimension should always be an element[45]. It is essential however that in this process the needs of the sending countries are fully recognised, and that the focus is not simply on ensuring that they co-operate in, for example, taking back illegal immigrants.

The United Kingdom situation

38. There has long been a regular flow of economic migrants to the United Kingdom. The flow accelerated in the second half of the 20th century, initially mainly from Commonwealth countries. But until recently there have been few "positive" immigration programmes designed to encourage people with particular skills to come to the United Kingdom for settlement—in contrast with countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States. The work permit scheme has been the main instrument used to fill specific vacancies which could not be filled by indigenous—or EU—workers. And inward migration was often balanced or exceeded by outward migration. However, since 1993, when there was a small net outflow of migrants, inward migration has consistently exceeded outward migration by varying amounts. The differences were relatively small up to 1997, but have increased since then. In 2004 an estimated 223,000 more people migrated to the United Kingdom than migrated abroad, compared with 152,000 in 2003.[46]

39. Forecasts in this area are notoriously unreliable, but, taking account of these trends and of current policies, the Government Actuary's Department has assumed an annual level of net inward migration of 130,000 a year in its central projection of future population growth. It has also published variant projections on the basis of high and low levels of net migration of 190,000 and 70,000 a year respectively.[47] On the central projection, the population of the United Kingdom would increase by 6.1 million in the period from 2003 to 2031, some five sixths of this increase being attributable to either the migrants themselves (3.6 million of the increase) or their effect on births and deaths (1.5 million). MigrationWatch argued on the basis of these figures that additional restrictions on immigration were required, simply to prevent overcrowding of an already crowded island, with the accompanying pressures on services, particularly in south-east England.[48]

40. Immigration is a complex phenomenon and it is not possible to produce a comprehensive assessment of its economic and social costs and benefits. We discussed the economic aspect earlier in this chapter and concluded that there is a broad consensus that the immigration of low-skilled and unskilled workers does not generally depress wages or take away jobs that would otherwise be done by indigenous workers. On the contrary, economic migration tends to stimulate further economic activity and create additional jobs. The social consequences are more difficult to quantify. On the one hand, unplanned immigration, as experienced with the peak arrivals of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2003, can add to problems in local communities and impose additional pressures on services; and large scale immigration, if concentrated on particular areas of the country, such as south-east England, can add to the strains on the local infrastructure. The TUC witnesses drew attention to the effect on housing, schools and health services in some rural areas where industrialised farming had developed with a need for unskilled labour without adequate planning.[49] On the other hand, immigration brings social benefits too, providing skills that are in short supply and filling gaps in essential services like the NHS and in other sectors, such as the construction and hospitality sectors.[50]

41. We were concerned that immigration of low-skilled workers could be used by employers as a cheap substitute for training the indigenous work force and could adversely affect schemes designed to improve the skills of disadvantaged young people. On the training side we were reassured by the figures that the CBI gave us of the amount invested in training and development by British industry;[51] and on youth unemployment by the information that Mrs Hodge gave us on the effects of the Welfare to Work Programme.[52] But it is important to remain alert to these dangers, particularly in the event of a less favourable economic climate.

Conclusion

42. At the risk of stating the obvious, economic migration is largely driven by economic considerations. Many migrants will return home after a period of economic activity in the host country, either because of a down turn in the economy or because they have saved enough money to meet their needs at home, at least for a period of time. Mr Don Flynn of the JCWI gave a striking example of this phenomenon. He told us that of the 27 million Turks who migrated to Germany in the 1960s some 25 million returned to Turkey.[53]

43. We do not believe that it is possible to set an overall limit for net immigration, as MigrationWatch has argued, based on some arbitrary assessment of the optimum population of the United Kingdom. There are too many imponderables, not least, as the Government Actuary has pointed out,[54] in relation to future projections of net immigration, which are notoriously uncertain. While immigration controls allow at least a degree of control of inward migration, there is, rightly, no parallel control of people leaving the country. Levels of net immigration have fluctuated widely in the past and, as mentioned above, have often been negative. The current relatively high levels are associated with a long period of uninterrupted growth and prosperity, which is unlikely to be a coincidence. Overall we endorse the Government's view that national economic considerations should remain the primary determinant of the level of economic immigration, provided that this is not at the expense of the interests of the other parties involved, notably the sending countries and, most importantly, the migrant workers themselves, whose rights must not be infringed.

3 Gott and Johnston, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Occasional Paper
No 77. Back

4 Rowthorn, R, The Economic Impact of Immigration Civitas online Report, 2004 www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/Rowthorm_Immigration.pdf; Lilley, P Too Much of a Good Thing? Towards a Balanced Approach to Immigration, Centre for Policy Studies www.cps.org.uk/pdf/pub/409.pdf . Back

5 Sriskandarajah, Cooley and Reed, IPPR, April 2005. Back

6 p 53. Back

7 Q 48. Back

8 Q 139. Back

9 Q 144. Back

10 The benefits excluded in this way are: Attendance Allowance, Child Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Disability Living Allowance, Disabled Person's Tax Credit, Working Families Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, Income Support, Job Seeker's Allowance, Invalid Care Allowance, Severe Disablement Allowance, and housing provided by local authorities. Emergency NHS treatment is free of charge for anyone who needs it, regardless of how long they have been, or intend to stay, in the United Kingdom. Those who come to the United Kingdom to work, either as an employee or self-employed person, are entitled to free NHS hospital treatment. Back

11 Population Projects 2004/2050: EU25 Population rises until 2025 then falls (Eurostat, 48/2005, 8 April 2005). Back

12 Article 59 of the EEC Treaty, now Article 49 TEC. Back

13 Q 355. Back

14 Q 396. Back